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## PART ONE: ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF STRATEGY

- ## PART TWO: FIRM BOUNDARIES

- ## PART THREE: MARKET AND COMPETITIVE ANALYSIS

- ## PART FOUR: STRATEGIC POSITION AND DYNAMICS

- ## PART FIVE: INTERNAL ORGANIZATION

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# CONTENTS

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## INTRODUCTION: STRATEGY AND ECONOMICS 1

Why Study Strategy? 1

Why Economics? 2

The Need for Principles 3

So What's the Problem? 3

A Framework for Strategy 5

Boundaries of the Firm 6

Market and Competitive Analysis 6

Position and Dynamics 6

Internal Organization 6

Endnotes 7

## *PART ONE: ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF STRATEGY 9*

### 1 BASIC MICROECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 11

#### Costs 12

##### Cost Functions 12

Total Cost Functions 12

Fixed and Variable Costs 14

Average and Marginal Cost Functions 15

The Importance of the Time Period: Long-Run versus Short-Run Cost Functions 18

Sunk versus Avoidable Costs 20

#### Economic Costs and Profitability 21

Economic versus Accounting Costs 21

Economic Profit versus Accounting Profit 22

#### Demand and Revenues 22

Demand Curve 23

The Price Elasticity of Demand 24

Brand-Level versus Industry-Level Elasticities 26

Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue Functions 26

#### Theory of the Firm: Pricing and Output Decisions 28

#### Perfect Competition 30

#### Game Theory 34

Games in Matrix Form and the Concept of Nash Equilibrium 35

Game Trees and Subgame Perfection	36
Chapter Summary	38
Questions	39
Endnotes	39
<b>2 ECONOMIES OF SCALE AND SCOPE</b>	<b>41</b>
Where Do Economies of Scale Come From?	41
Definition of Economies of Scale	42
Definition of Economies of Scope	43
Where Do Scale Economies Come From?	45
Indivisibilities and the Spreading of Fixed Costs	45
Economies of Scale Due to Spreading of Product-Specific Fixed Costs	45
Economies of Scale Due to Tradeoffs among Alternative Technologies	46
<i>Example 2.1: Hub-and-Spoke Networks and Economies of Scope in the Airline Industry</i>	48
Indivisibilities Are More Likely When Production Is Capital Intensive	49
“The Division of Labor Is Limited by the Extent of the Market”	49
<i>Example 2.2: The Division of Labor in Medical Markets</i>	50
Inventories	52
The Cube-Square Rule and the Physical Properties of Production	52
<i>Example 2.3: Hypermarkets</i>	53
Special Sources of Economies of Scale and Scope	54
Economies of Scale and Scope in Purchasing	54
Economies of Scale and Scope in Advertising	55
Costs of Sending Messages per Potential Consumer	55
Advertising Reach and Umbrella Branding	56
Economies of Scale in Research and Development	56
<i>Example 2.4: The Pharmaceutical Merger Wave</i>	57
Complementarities and Strategic Fit	58
Sources of Diseconomies of Scale	58
Labor Costs and Firm Size	59
Spreading Specialized Resources Too Thin	59
“Conflicting Out”	59
Incentive and Coordination Effects	60
<i>Example 2.5: Ethanol Production in Brazil</i>	60
The Learning Curve	61
The Concept of the Learning Curve	61
Expanding Output to Obtain a Cost Advantage	62
The Boston Consulting Group Growth/Share Paradigm	63
Learning and Organization	65
The Learning Curve versus Economies of Scale	65
<i>Example 2.6: Learning by Doing in Medicine</i>	66
Chapter Summary	67
Questions	68
Appendix: Using Regression Analysis to Estimate the Shapes of	
Cost Curves and Learning Curves	69
Estimating Cost Curves	69
Estimating Learning Curves	70
Endnotes	71

**3 AGENCY AND COORDINATION 73****Where Do Agency Problems Come From? 73***Example 3.1: Differences in Objectives in Agency Relationships: Yahoo! and English Fruit 75**Example 3.2: Hidden Action and Hidden Information in Garment Factory Fire Insurance 77***Where Do Coordination Problems Come From? 78***Example 3.3: Offshoring To and From India 80***Combating Agency Problems 81****Monitoring 81****Performance-Based Incentives 82***Example 3.4: Performance-Based Incentives: The Zambia Performance-Based Incentives Pilot Study 88***Bureaucracy 89***Example 3.5: Corporate Risk Management at Goldman Sachs 90***Combating Coordination Problems 91****Centralization 91****Decentralization 92****Chapter Summary 93****Questions 94****Endnotes 95****4 THE POWER OF PRINCIPLES: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 97****The World in 1840 98****Doing Business in 1840 98****Conditions of Business in 1840: Life without a Modern Infrastructure 99***Example 4.1: The Emergence of Chicago 100*  
**Summary 103****The World in 1910 103****Doing Business in 1910 103***Example 4.2: Building National Infrastructure: China and the United States 104***Business Conditions in 1910: A “Modern” Infrastructure 106***Example 4.3: Evolution of the Steel Industry 107*  
**Summary 109****The World Today 109****Doing Business Today 109****Modern Infrastructure 110****Summary 112***Example 4.4: The Gaizhi Privatization Process in China 112*  
**Infrastructure in Emerging Markets 113****Three Different Worlds: Consistent Principles, Changing Conditions, and Adaptive Strategies 113****Chapter Summary 114****Questions 115****Endnotes 115**

## PART TWO: FIRM BOUNDARIES 117

### 5 THE VERTICAL BOUNDARIES OF THE FIRM 119

#### Make versus Buy 120

##### Upstream, Downstream 120

*Example 5.1: A Global Perspective on Mergers for Vertical Integration 121*

##### Defining Boundaries 122

##### Some Make-or-Buy Fallacies 123

*Example 5.2: Employee Skills: Make or Buy? 126*

#### Reasons to “Buy” 127

##### Exploiting Scale and Learning Economies 127

##### Bureaucracy Effects: Avoiding Agency and Influence Costs 129

##### Agency Costs 129

*Example 5.3: Disconnection at Sony 130*

##### Influence Costs 131

#### Reasons to “Make” 131

##### The Economic Foundations of Contracts 131

##### Complete versus Incomplete Contracting 132

##### Bounded Rationality 133

##### Difficulties Specifying or Measuring Performance 133

##### Asymmetric Information 133

##### The Role of Contract Law 134

##### Coordination of Production Flows through the Vertical Chain 134

##### Leakage of Private Information 136

##### Transactions Costs 136

##### Relationship-Specific Assets 137

##### Forms of Asset Specificity 137

##### Rents and Quasi-Rents 138

*Example 5.4: The Fundamental Transformation in the U.S. Automobile Industry 139*

##### The Holdup Problem 140

##### The Holdup Problem and Transactions Costs 141

##### Contract Negotiation and Renegotiation 141

*Example 5.5: Power Barges 142*

*Example 5.6: A Game of Chicken? Specificity and Underinvestment in the Broiler Industry 143*

##### Investments to Improve *Ex Post* Bargaining Positions 143

##### Distrust 144

##### Reduced Investment 144

##### Recap: From Relationship-Specific Assets to Transactions Costs 144

##### Double Marginalization: A Final Consideration 144

#### Summarizing Make-or-Buy Decisions: The Make-or-Buy

##### Decision Tree 145

#### Chapter Summary 146

#### Questions 147

#### Endnotes 148

### 6 ORGANIZING VERTICAL BOUNDARIES: VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND ITS ALTERNATIVES 150

#### Technical Efficiency versus Agency Efficiency 150

##### Economizing 150

	<b>The Technical Efficiency/Agency Efficiency Tradeoff and Vertical Integration</b>	151
	<i>Example 6.1: Vertical Integration in a Mountain Paradise</i>	154
	<b>Real-World Evidence</b>	155
	<i>Example 6.2: Gone in a Heartbeat: The Allegheny Health Education and Research Foundation Bankruptcy</i>	157
	<b>Vertical Integration and Asset Ownership</b>	158
	<i>Example 6.3: Vertical Integration of the Sales Force in the Insurance Industry</i>	160
	<b>Governance Issues in Vertical Mergers</b>	161
	<b>Alternatives to Vertical Integration</b>	162
	<b>Tapered Integration: Make and Buy</b>	162
	<i>Example 6.4: Tapered Integration in Clinical Research</i>	163
	<b>Strategic Alliances and Joint Ventures</b>	164
	<i>Example 6.5: Toys “R” Us Enters Japan</i>	165
	<b>Collaborative Relationships</b>	167
	Subcontractor Networks	167
	<i>Example 6.6: Interfirm Business Networks: The Downsides of Keiretsu</i>	168
	Keiretsu	169
	<b>Implicit Contracts and Long-Term Relationships</b>	169
	<b>Chapter Summary</b>	171
	<b>Questions</b>	172
	<b>Endnotes</b>	173
<b>7</b>	<b>DIVERSIFICATION</b>	175
	<b>A Brief History</b>	175
	<i>Example 7.1: Changes in Diversification, from American Can to Primerica</i>	177
	<b>Why Do Firms Diversify?</b>	178
	<b>Efficiency-Based Reasons for Diversification</b>	179
	Economies of Scale and Scope	179
	Economizing on Transaction Costs	180
	Internal Capital Markets	181
	Diversifying Shareholders’ Portfolios	181
	<i>Example 7.2: Acquiring for Synergy: Procter &amp; Gamble and the International Market for Men’s Grooming Products</i>	182
	Identifying Undervalued Firms	183
	<b>Potential Costs of Diversification</b>	184
	<b>Managerial Reasons for Diversification</b>	185
	Benefits to Managers from Acquisitions	186
	Problems of Corporate Governance	187
	<i>Example 7.3: Managerial Motives for Diversification: The Strange Case of Tyco International</i>	188
	<b>The Market for Corporate Control and Recent Changes in Corporate Governance</b>	188
	<b>Performance of Diversified Firms</b>	191
	Studies of Operating Performance	192
	Valuation and Event Studies	192
	<i>Example 7.4: The Search for Synergy in New Markets: eBay’s Acquisition Binge</i>	194
	<b>Long-Term Performance of Diversified Firms</b>	195
	<b>A Conglomerate with a Record of Success</b>	196
	<b>Chapter Summary</b>	197
	<b>Questions</b>	198
	<b>Endnotes</b>	199

## PART THREE: MARKET AND COMPETITIVE ANALYSIS 203

### 8 COMPETITORS AND COMPETITION 205

#### Competitor Identification and Market Definition 206

##### The Basics of Competitor Identification 206

*Example 8.1: The SSNIP in Action: Defining Hospital Markets* 207

##### Putting Competitor Identification into Practice 207

##### Empirical Approaches to Competitor Identification 208

##### Geographic Competitor Identification 209

#### Measuring Market Structure 210

*Example 8.2: Defining Coca-Cola's Market* 211

#### Market Structure and Competition 212

##### Perfect Competition 213

Many Sellers 213

Homogeneous Products 214

Excess Capacity 214

*Example 8.3: Gazprom* 215

##### Monopoly 217

##### Monopolistic Competition 218

Entry into Monopolistically Competitive Markets 220

##### Oligopoly 221

Cournot Quantity Competition 222

*Example 8.4: Capacity Competition in the U.S. Beef-Processing Industry* 223

Bertrand Price Competition 226

*Example 8.5: Cournot Equilibrium in the Corn Wet Milling Industry* 227

Why Are Cournot and Bertrand Different? 228

Bertrand Price Competition When Products Are Horizontally

Differentiated 229

#### Where Does Market Structure Come From? 231

##### Sutton's Endogenous Sunk Costs 232

*Example 8.6: A Dog-Eat-Dog World: The Demise of the Online Pet Supply Industry* 233

#### Evidence on Market Structure and Performance 233

##### Price and Concentration 233

#### Chapter Summary 234

#### Questions 235

#### Endnotes 236

### 9 STRATEGIC COMMITMENT 238

#### Why Commitment Is Important 239

*Example 9.1: Loblaw versus Wal-Mart Canada* 240

*Example 9.2: Strategic Commitment and Preemption in the Global Airframe Market: Airbus versus Boeing* 242

#### Strategic Commitment and Competition 243

##### Strategic Complements and Strategic Substitutes 243

*Example 9.3: Commitment and Irreversibility in the Airline Industry* 245

Strategic Incentives to Make Commitments 246

##### Tough versus Soft Commitments 246

Tough and Soft Commitments in Cournot and Bertrand Equilibria 246

Stage 2 Competition Is Cournot 247

<i>Example 9.4: Commitment at Nucor and USX: The Case of Thin-Slab Casting</i>	249
Stage 2 Competition Is Bertrand	250
<b>A Taxonomy of Commitment Strategies</b>	251
Making Sense of the Taxonomy	253
<i>Example 9.5: Commitment versus Flexibility in the CD Market</i>	254
<b>Flexibility and Real Options</b>	255
<i>Example 9.6: Corning's Nuclear Winter</i>	257
<b>A Framework for Analyzing Commitments</b>	258
<b>Chapter Summary</b>	260
<b>Questions</b>	260
<b>Endnotes</b>	262
<b>10 THE DYNAMICS OF PRICING RIVALRY</b>	264
<b>Dynamic Pricing Rivalry</b>	265
Why the Cournot and Bertrand Models Are Not Dynamic	265
Dynamic Pricing Rivalry: Intuition	266
Competitor Responses and Tit-for-Tat Pricing	267
<i>Example 10.1: The General Motors Employee Discount Price War</i>	269
Tit-for-Tat Pricing with Many Firms	270
<i>Example 10.2: What Happens When a Firm Retaliates Quickly to a Price Cut:</i> <i>Philip Morris versus B.A.T. in Costa Rica</i>	271
The "Folk Theorem"	272
Coordination	272
Why Is Tit-for-Tat So Compelling?	274
Misreads	274
<i>Example 10.3: Forgiveness and Provocability: Dow Chemicals and the Market for</i> <i>Reverse Osmosis Membrane</i>	275
<b>How Market Structure Affects the Sustainability of</b>	
<b>Cooperative Pricing</b>	276
Market Concentration and the Sustainability of Cooperative Pricing	276
Reaction Speed, Detection Lags, and the Sustainability of	
Cooperative Pricing	277
Lumpiness of Orders	278
Information about Sales Transactions	279
The Number of Buyers	280
Volatility of Demand Conditions	280
Asymmetries among Firms and the Sustainability of Cooperative Prices	280
<i>Example 10.4: When Trust Is Broken: The Dutch Beer Cartel</i>	282
Price Sensitivity of Buyers and the Sustainability of Cooperative Pricing	283
Market Structure and the Sustainability of Cooperative Pricing: Summary	284
<i>Example 10.5: How Market Structure Conditions Conspire to Limit Profitability</i> <i>in the Heavy-Duty Truck Engine Industry</i>	285
<b>Facilitating Practices</b>	286
Price Leadership	286
Advance Announcement of Price Changes	287
Most Favored Customer Clauses	287
Uniform Delivered Prices	288
Facilitating Practices and Antitrust	289
<b>Quality Competition</b>	290
Quality Choice in Competitive Markets	290
<i>Example 10.6: Product Quality: Fiat Enters the U.S. Market... Again</i>	291

- Quality Choices of Sellers with Market Power 292
  - The Marginal Cost of Increasing Quality 293
  - The Marginal Benefit of Improving Quality 293
- Chapter Summary 295
- Questions 295
- Endnotes 296
  
- 11 ENTRY AND EXIT 299
  - Some Facts about Entry and Exit 300
  - Entry and Exit Decisions: Basic Concepts 301
    - Barriers to Entry 302
      - Bain's Typology of Entry Conditions 302
      - Analyzing Entry Conditions: The Asymmetry Requirement 302
    - Example 11.1: Hyundai's Entry into the Steel Industry* 303
    - Structural Entry Barriers 304
    - Example 11.2: Emirates Air* 306
    - Barriers to Exit 308
  - Entry-Deterring Strategies 309
    - Limit Pricing 310
      - Example 11.3: Limit Pricing by Brazilian Cement Manufacturers* 311
      - Is Strategic Limit Pricing Rational? 312
    - Example 11.4: Entry Barriers and Profitability in the Japanese Brewing Industry* 313
    - Predatory Pricing 315
      - The Chain-Store Paradox 315
      - Rescuing Limit Pricing and Predation: The Importance of Uncertainty and Reputation 315
    - Example 11.5: Predatory Pricing in the Laboratory* 316
    - Capacity Expansion 318
    - "Judo Economics" and the "Puppy-Dog Ploy" 318
  - Exit-Promoting Strategies 319
    - Wars of Attrition 320
    - Example 11.6: Wal-Mart Enters Germany...and Exits* 321
  - Evidence on Entry-Deterring Behavior 321
    - An Entry-Deterrence Checklist 322
    - Survey Data on Entry Deterrence 323
  - Chapter Summary 323
  - Questions 324
  - Endnotes 325
  
- 12 INDUSTRY ANALYSIS 327
  - Performing a Five-Forces Analysis 328
    - Internal Rivalry 329
    - Entry 331
    - Substitutes and Complements 331
    - Supplier Power and Buyer Power 332
    - Strategies for Coping with the Five Forces 333
  - Coopetition and the Value Net 333
  - Applying the Five Forces: Some Industry Analyses 336
    - Chicago Hospital Markets Then and Now 336
    - Market Definition 336

Internal Rivalry	336
Entry	337
Substitutes and Complements	338
Supplier Power	338
Buyer Power	339
<b>Commercial Airframe Manufacturing</b>	<b>340</b>
Market Definition	340
Internal Rivalry	340
Barriers to Entry	342
Substitutes and Complements	342
Supplier Power	343
Buyer Power	343
<b>Professional Sports</b>	<b>344</b>
Market Definition	344
Internal Rivalry	344
Entry	347
Substitutes and Complements	349
Supplier Power	350
Buyer Power	350
Conclusion	350
<b>Chapter Summary</b>	<b>351</b>
<b>Questions</b>	<b>351</b>
<b>Appendix: Template for Doing a Five-Forces Analysis</b>	<b>352</b>
<b>Endnotes</b>	<b>355</b>

## ***PART FOUR: STRATEGIC POSITION AND DYNAMICS*** 357

### **13 STRATEGIC POSITIONING FOR COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE** 359

<b>Competitive Advantage</b>	<b>362</b>
Competitive Advantage Defined	362
What Matters More for Profitability: The Market or the Firm?	364
<b>Competitive Advantage and Value Creation: Conceptual Foundations</b>	<b>365</b>
Maximum Willingness-to-Pay and Consumer Surplus	365
From Maximum Willingness-to-Pay to Consumer Surplus	367
Value-Created	369
<i>Example 13.1: The Division of the Value-Created in the Sale of Beer at a Baseball Game</i>	371
Value Creation and Win-Win Business Opportunities	372
Value Creation and Competitive Advantage	372
Analyzing Value Creation	373
<i>Example 13.2: The Rising Price Tag on Competitive Advantage in the Beautiful Game</i>	374
Value Creation and the Value Chain	375
Value Creation, Resources, and Capabilities	376
<i>Example 13.3: Creating Value: Cadbury in India</i>	377
<i>Example 13.4: Measuring Capabilities in the Pharmaceutical Industry</i>	378
<b>Strategic Positioning: Cost Advantage and Benefit Advantage</b>	<b>379</b>
Generic Strategies	379
The Strategic Logic of Cost Leadership	379
The Strategic Logic of Benefit Leadership	382
Extracting Profits from Cost and Benefit Advantage: The Importance of the Price Elasticity of Demand	382

<i>Example 13.5: Benefit Leadership by Superquinn</i>	384
<b>Comparing Cost and Benefit Advantages</b>	387
<b>“Stuck in the Middle”</b>	388
<i>Example 13.6: Strategic Positioning in the Airline Industry: Four Decades of Change</i>	390
<b>Strategic Positioning: Broad Coverage versus Focus Strategies</b>	393
Segmenting an Industry	393
Broad-Coverage Strategies	395
Focus Strategies	395
<b>Chapter Summary</b>	397
<b>Questions</b>	399
<b>Appendix: Cost Drivers, Benefit Drivers, and Value-Added Analysis</b>	400
<b>Endnotes</b>	407
<b>14 SUSTAINING COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE</b>	410
<b>How Hard Is It to Sustain Profits?</b>	411
Threats to Sustainability in Competitive and Monopolistically Competitive Markets	411
Threats to Sustainability under All Market Structures	412
<i>Example 14.1: “Von-a-Bees”</i>	413
Evidence: The Persistence of Profitability	414
<b>Sustainable Competitive Advantage</b>	415
The Resource-Based Theory of the Firm	415
<i>Example 14.2: Losing Focus: Starbucks Down in Down Under</i>	416
Isolating Mechanisms	418
<i>Example 14.3: American versus Northwest in Yield Management</i>	419
<b>Impediments to Imitation</b>	421
Legal Restrictions	421
<i>Example 14.4: Cola Wars in Venezuela</i>	422
Superior Access to Inputs or Customers	423
Market Size and Scale Economies	424
Intangible Barriers to Imitation	425
<b>Early-Mover Advantages</b>	426
Learning Curve	426
Reputation and Buyer Uncertainty	427
Buyer Switching Costs	427
<i>Example 14.5: Building Blocks of Sustainable Advantage</i>	428
Network Effects	429
<b>Early-Mover Disadvantages</b>	432
<i>Example 14.6: The Microsoft Case</i>	433
<b>Imperfect Imitability and Industry Equilibrium</b>	434
<b>Chapter Summary</b>	436
<b>Questions</b>	437
<b>Endnotes</b>	438
<b>15 THE ORIGINS OF COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE: INNOVATION, EVOLUTION, AND THE ENVIRONMENT</b>	441
<b>Creative Destruction</b>	443
Disruptive Technologies	444
Sustainability and Creative Destruction	444

<i>Example 15.1: The Sunk Cost Effect in Steel: The Adoption of the Basic Oxygen Furnace</i>	446
<b>The Incentive to Innovate</b>	447
The Sunk Cost Effect	447
The Replacement Effect	447
The Efficiency Effect	448
<b>Innovation and the Market for Ideas</b>	449
<i>Example 15.2: Innovation and Organization in the Early Auto Industry</i>	450
Allocating Innovative Capital	450
<b>Innovation Competition</b>	451
Patent Races	451
Choosing the Technology	452
Riskiness of R&D	452
<i>Example 15.3: One Can Never Be Too Thin: Innovation in TV Sets</i>	453
<i>Example 15.4: Sparking Automotive Innovation: The U.K. in the 2009 X-Prize</i>	454
Correlated Research Strategies	455
<b>Evolutionary Economics and Dynamic Capabilities</b>	455
<i>Example 15.5: The Rise of the Swiss Watch Industry</i>	456
<b>The Environment</b>	457
<b>Managing Innovation</b>	459
<i>Example 15.6: Competence, History, and Geography: The Nokia Story</i>	460
<b>Chapter Summary</b>	461
<b>Questions</b>	462
<b>Endnotes</b>	463

## **PART FIVE: INTERNAL ORGANIZATION 467**

<b>16 PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT AND INCENTIVES IN FIRMS</b>	469
<b>Economics of Performance Measurement</b>	470
<b>Risk Aversion and Risk Sharing</b>	470
Preferences over Risky Outcomes	470
Risk Sharing	472
<b>Risk and Incentives</b>	474
<i>Example 16.1: Pay and Performance at Yakima Valley Orchards</i>	478
<b>Performance Measures That Fail to Reflect All Desired Actions</b>	479
<i>Example 16.2: Cardiovascular Surgery Report Cards</i>	480
<b>Selecting Performance Measures: Managing Tradeoffs between Costs</b>	483
<b>Do Pay-for-Performance Incentives Work?</b>	485
<i>Example 16.3: Herding, Relative Performance Evaluation, and the 2007–2008 Credit Crisis</i>	486
<b>Incentives in Firms</b>	488
<b>Implicit Incentive Contracts</b>	488
Subjective Performance Evaluation	489
Promotion Tournaments	490
Efficiency Wages and the Threat of Termination	493
<i>Example 16.4: Grooming the Top Talent: GE and TAS</i>	494
<b>Incentives in Teams</b>	496
<i>Example 16.5: Stock Options for Middle-Level Employees</i>	499

*Example 16.6: Teams and Communication in Steel Mills* 500

**Chapter Summary** 501

**Questions** 502

**Endnotes** 503

## 17 STRATEGY AND STRUCTURE 507

**An Introduction to Structure** 509

**Individuals, Teams, and Hierarchies** 509

**Complex Hierarchy** 510

Departmentalization 510

Coordination and Control 511

**Types of Organizational Structures** 512

Functional Structure (U-Form) 513

Multidivisional Structure (M-Form) 514

Matrix Structure 515

*Example 17.1: Enter the Matrix: Organizational Structure at Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs* 517

Matrix or Division? A Model of Optimal Structure 518

Network Structure 519

Why Are There So Few Types? 521

**Structure–Environment Coherence** 521

Technology and Task Interdependence 522

Efficient Information Processing 523

*Example 17.2: Organizational Structure at AT&T* 525

**Structure Follows Strategy** 525

*Example 17.3: Strategy, Structure, and the Attempted Merger between the University of Chicago Hospital and Michael Reese Hospital* 527

*Example 17.4: Recent Changes to Divisional Structures* 528

Strategy, Structure, and the Multinational Firm 529

Structure, Strategy, Knowledge, and Capabilities 529

*Example 17.5: Transnational Strategy and Organization Structure at SmithKline-Beecham* 530

Structure as Routine and Heuristic 530

**Chapter Summary** 531

**Questions** 533

**Endnotes** 534

## 18 ENVIRONMENT, POWER, AND CULTURE 536

**The Social Context of Firm Behavior** 536

**Internal Context** 537

**Power** 538

The Sources of Power 539

Structural Views of Power 540

*Example 18.1: The Sources of Presidential Power* 541

Do Successful Organizations Need Powerful Managers? 543

*Example 18.2: Power and Poor Performance: The Case of the 1957 Mercury* 543

The Decision to Allocate Formal Power to Individuals 544

*Example 18.3: Power in the Boardroom: Why Let CEOs Choose Directors?* 545

**Culture** 546

Culture and Performance 546

Culture Complements Formal Controls 548

<i>Example 18.4: Corporate Culture and Inertia at ICI</i>	548
Culture Facilitates Cooperation and Reduces Bargaining Costs	549
Culture, Inertia, and Performance	550
<b>External Context, Institutions, and Strategies</b>	<b>550</b>
Institutions and Regulation	551
Interfirm Resource-Dependence Relationships	552
<i>Example 18.5: Setting the Standards for ESG</i>	554
Institutional Logics: Beliefs, Values, and Behavioral Norms	555
<b>Chapter Summary</b>	<b>557</b>
<b>Questions</b>	<b>559</b>
<b>Endnotes</b>	<b>559</b>
 GLOSSARY	 563
 NAME INDEX	 573
 SUBJECT INDEX	 579